Turkish Daily News 23 February 2004
Yuksel Soylemez
End game in Cyprus
Question - Is this really the end of the game in Cyprus?
Soylemez - My impression is "yes." Definitely an endgame. I lost a bet with the
former German envoy to Ankara, Ambassador Schmidt, that the Cyprus question
would be solved by the end of 2003. Better now, a little late, than never.
Question - Why has the Cyprus question now gained such urgency and momentum?
Soylemez - For a number of reasons, but above all else because the strategic
island of Cypus is part of the "grand new design" of the extended map of the
Middle East. This map encompasses the sources of power and oil and natural gas
in Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the Caucusus, Azerbaijan, Kazakhistan and
Turkmenistan. In other words, the new extended map of the Middle East includes,
in addition to the above, Iran, Afghanistan and some states bordering China and
Russia, as drawn by the Pentagon cartographers of the United States. This map
certainly includes the strategic "aircraft-carrier" island of Cyprus.
Question - There have been sovereign British bases on the island since 1960,
haven't there?
Soylemez - Foreign bases in any country are not unusual, but the term "sovereign
bases" is, I believe, a new concept of international law and probably unique to
Cyprus. In this case a seemingly sovereign country, the Republic of Cyprus, has
transferred the sovereignty of part of its territory to another country with an
international agreement valid in perpetuity. I do not think there is any other
parallel or example anywhere in international practice. This is sufficient to
underline the perpetual strategic importance of the island to the British and,
through the British, to the Western world and in particular NATO and the United
States.
Question - There have been some press reports that the United States is
interested in stationing forces on "American bases" on the island?
Soylemez - The information was probably correct. It must have been leaked with
the purpose of testing the water and preparing international public opinion.
Later the base requirement was denied, but not the stationing of U.S. forces on
Cyprus. Obviously they could use the two British bases Akrotiri and Dhikelia
even now. I would not be surprised if there is an announcement that U.S. Rapid
Development Forces will be stationed in Cyprus once the island is reunited and
there is a return to stability as required by the United States.
Question - Do you mean to say that the United States is involved in the
solution of the Cyprus problem more than any other power? More than the EU, more
than the parties directly concerned, including the guarantor countries, with
Britain apparently taking less of an interest in this final stage?
Soylemez - Yes, guarantor Britain, one of the authors of the Annan plan, is now
maintaining a low profile for a good reason of its own. It is the Bush
administration that is determined to solve the Cyprus problem. This will
facilitate putting together one part of the jigsaw puzzle of the grand design of
the extended Middle East. Let me add that it is to the advantage of the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC) and also to the benefit of Turkey that the
question be solved now rather than later, to facilitate, even guarantee, the
start of Turkey-EU negotiations. The reason for this, of course, is the EU
deadline of May 1 for the membership of Greek Cyprus. This is why Prime Minister
Tayyip Recep Erdogan was so astonishingly forthcoming in his new initiative,
first in Davos and later at the White House. It was more than a popularity
contest. He was in the White House with President George Bush to repair and
reconstruct Turkish-American relations, which were badly damaged because of
reneging on promises maeabout Iraq. It was also a display to the world of his
government's sincerity in wishing to solve the Cyprus problem.
Question - By making the "volte face" of accepting the Annan plan as a
reference point and thus taking a step beyond the Greek position, wasn't he
taking the biggest gamble of his political life?
Soylemez - Yes, it was indeed a huge gamble. But remember the dictum, "no risk,
no gain." He took a calculated risk, and he knew he had to take it to ensure
Turkey's candidature for the EU. He realized that the Bush administration was as
much behind the idea of the plan as its main author. It was an American plan as
much as it was a British plan.
Question - So the secretary-general's peace initiative was not entirely his
own? He had the full support and force of the Bush Administration behind him?
Soylemez - Undoubtedly. The secretary-general needs a success for the United
Nations. He is staking his reputation on the success or the failure of the
efforts. In other words, he too has taken a calculated gamble, but he must have
been given assurances that this time was not like any other time. This is the
endgame, even if it is a shotgun marriage of convenience. Success is almost at
hand for the United Nations. The success of a solution, whatever form it may
take, was virtually guaranteed from the time Bush told Erdogan in the Oval
Office, "Solve the Cyprus problem," and Erdogan, as a Turkish samurai,
immediately promised him he would do so.
Question - Are the modalities of the agreement important for the United
States?
Soylemez - The details are certainly of no consequence, so long as the parties
settle their differences within the parameters of the Annan plan. The United
Stats is interested in the stability of the Middle East, period.
Question - Both the Turkish and the Greek sides are on record that they do
not like the Annan plan. So if they agree on the basis of the plan, despite
their dislike and distrust of it, do you think there is a chance of its final
agreed version being implemented, in spite of themselves?
Soylemez - Once both sides are within the EU, any problems that may arise have a
better chance of being solved "within the family" as the agreement will be in
conformity with, and accommodated within, the "acquis" of Cyprus' accession to
the EU. It has been said that the Annan plan has the potential to create more
problems than it may solve. No plan is perfect or foolproof. It is obvious that
there will be problems both in the negotiation and later in the implementation
stage. Again remember -- no risk, no gain. Goodwill and sincerity are the key.
They should be encouraged to overcome the difficulties with the realization that
both will gain from the solution, in other words, to look at the bigger picture.
Question - KKTC President Rauf Denktas was previously extremely critical of
the plan. Now he started negotiations on Feb. 19 in Nicosia with Greek Cypriot
President Tassos Papadopoulos on the basis of that "notorious" plan. What made
him change his mind?
Soylemez - I don't think he has changed his mind about the Annan plan. He needed
to display sincerity and goodwill in order to find a solution in the best
interests of the Turkish Cypriots and of Turkey. His people, the Turkish
Cypriots, have made it clear that they regard it in their best interest that
they should join the EU. He previously held the view that the KKTC should enter
the EU with Turkey. Now the urgency of time and political necessity dictate that
the KKTC should enter the EU with the Greek Cypriots before Turkey. To
facilitate Turkey's eventual accession, it is therefore in Turkey's national
interest that the Turkish Cypriots enter the EU. This is both a political bonus
and an insurance policy. As times change, adaptation to new developments becomes
vital so as not to be left out in the cold. It is no secret that pressure on the
part of Prime Minister Erdogan was a determining factor.
Question - Much criticism and many harsh words have been levelled against
President Denktas, the chief negotiator, that he was "unaccommodating," a
"hard-liner," "obstinate" and that his leadership was "archaic." Did he deserve
them?
Soylemez - There is a Turkish saying I have quoted ad nauseam to our Greek
friends: "People only throw stones at trees that bear fruit. Solve the problem
with Denktas, because you can't solve it with anybody else." He has nothing to
lose. His place in history as a great leader is safe. No, I would say that this
criticism was unjust. Indeed, now he is hailed for his performance in the New
York rounds.
Question - There were reports that he did not want to go to New York because
he did not share the views of Prime Minister Erdogan and his government. It was
rumored that he even proposed resigning as the chief negotiator.
Soylemez - All this may be true or false, I don't know. But one thing seems
obvious, that the Erdogan government decided to keep him as chief negotiator out
of their respect for him, and they insisted that he go to New York and sit at
the negotiating table on the 38th floor of the United Nations building. He was
told not to leave the table in order not to be blamed for the failure of the
negotiations. Put yourself in his shoes. Denktas probably said to the prime
minister: "But what should I negotiate? What should I accept? What should I
reject?" Obviously there were limits or red lines in his mind, and these most
likely differed in some respects from those of the Erdogan government.
Question - You must be referring to the road map prepared and discussed in
Ankara, giving the bare minimums the Turkish side could accept, mentioned by
Erdogan in the plane on his way to South Korea? Do you think a copy of this was
also given to the Bush administration?
Soylemez - Most certainly it was, to clarify the Turkish list of minimum
requirements, which number only four. Firstly, it stipulated that bizonality
should be made clearer in the plan. The percentage of Greek Cypriots who will
move to the north should be decreased from 21 percent to 15 percent. They should
only be able to vote in the local elections in the north, not the parliamentary
elections. For these they should vote in the south. There should be an equal
number of members of parliament from both sides, 24 from the Greek Cypriots, 24
from the Turkish Cypriots. The principle of bizonality should also include the
principle of bicommunality.
Question - And what is the second Turkish requirement?
Soylemez - That the dividing line of
the Turkish and Greek sides should be a straight line so as to make border
controls practicable and easier. The Turkish side seems flexible on the issue of
the amount of territory to be seceded to the Greek side. The KKTC now controls
about 36 percent of the island, and this may be reduced to around 29 percent.
Question - Isn't the third requirement about the question of security?
Soylemez - Yes. The third Turkish requirement is about the continued presence of
a Turkish contingent on the island. Their responsibilities should not be
diminished but recognized -- and even increased -- though their number may be
decreased. They should have freedom of movement, both in normal and emergency
situations.
Question - And the fourth requirement? Isn't it related to Turkey's position
as a guarantor power according to the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee?
Soylemez - As agreed by both parties in New York on Feb. 13, the
secretary-general outlined that the procedure concerning the road map will be
that if the two parties cannot agree before March 22, he will bring in the
Turkish and Greek sides for a week to try to reach an agreement on the
outstanding points, prior to March 29. If that does not work, he is going to
fill in the empty spaces himself so that there is an agreement ready to be
presented to the referenda simultaneously on April 21. The Turkish position is
that when Turkey and Greece enter the picture, their status as guarantors should
not be diminished but strengthened. As Annan and Denktas have said, it is the
citizens of Greek Cyprus and the KKTC who will make the final decision before
the May 1 deadline as to whether or not the island joins the EU as a unified
state.
Question - How and when will the national parliaments of the guarantor powers
adopt and ratify the final version of the agreed plan?
Soylemez - Originally it was proposed by Annan that the parliaments of Greece
and Turkey should ratify an agreement before it was put to referenda of the
citizens of the island, but following objections from both sides the procedure
will now be reversed, with the mother parliaments and the parliaments of Greek
Cyprus and Turkish Cyprus ratifying the agreement after the referenda, which is
logical.
Question - Do you think the prerequisites of the Turkish position that we
discussed above have any chance of being accommodated one way or another in the
negotiations which started on Feb. 19 in Nicosia and will continue until March
22, hopefully in good faith?
Soylemez - These are carefully considered fundamental requirements for Turkey.
Firstly, the maintenance of the presence of Turkish Cypriots on the island.
Secondly that the island of Cyprus should not pose a potential threat to Turkey.
The 1960 agreements met these two prerequisites. The Turkish side cannot accept
any formula or plan that negates or removes the rights and responsibilities and
the legal status provided for the Turkish Cypriots by the 1960 agreements, which
were international agreements deposited and registered as such with the United
Nations.
Question - To go back to the history of Cyprus of the 1960s doesn't really
help us at this late stage, does it?
Soylemez - It may. History sheds light on the present. On March 4, 1964 the
Security Council resolution recognized the Greek Cypriot administration as the
government of Cyprus. In fact, this resolution was in contradiction of the 1960
Constitution, which was confederal in nature, based on two peoples, Turkish and
Greek as two legally equal but separate communities. Since that resolution, the
Turkish Cypriots have had to fight an uphill battle, as the Greek Cypriot
leadership did not represent them but only themselves. This anomaly continued
for four decades. This was the reason the question has remained unresolved until
now because the resolution, which was conceived in theory, was negated by the
political realities on the island.
Question - Who is going to pay the cost, tens and millions of dollars, of the
repatriation and compensation required under the Annan plan?
Soylemez - Well, a new inclusion in the road map now mentions EU technical and
financial assistance for the implementation of the plan. Commissioner for
Enlargement Guenter Verheugen is already on the island, and it has been
announced that an initial contribution of 300 million euros will be made to the
Turkish north, with a further 10 billion eurod over the next few years. All this
will doubtless serve as a carrot and encourage efforts to achieve a solution
within the deadline. Indeed, KKTC Prime Minister Talat has said not even a bomb
exploding outside his house the night before the start of the negotiations is
going to deter him.
Question - You said that the 1960 agreements envisaged a confederal
arrangement?
Soylemez - Yes. The 1960 agreements were based on political equality, though not
numerical, among the Turks and Greeks. It must be remembered that the Cyprus
Republic was not completely sovereign under those agreements. It was not an
unfettered but a limited independence. The 1960 agreements were based on
domestic and external balances, internally between the two communities on the
island, and externally between Turkey and Greece. I say all this to recall the
realities of the past so that they may be reflected in the realities of today
for the future stability of the island.
Question - Does the Annan plan take into account these Greek and Turkish
balances?
Soylemez - Probably the authors did their best to be impartial, but their best
was obviously not enough for both sides. Not only was Denktas apprehensive about
it, but Karamanlis, who may well be the next prime minister of Greece, is on
record using words to the effect, "The Turkish Cypriots will be a minority
within the next decade or two when the island will become completely Greek."
Question - Why have the parties lost so much precious time since the
secretary-general announced his plan on Sept. 12, 2002?
Soylemez - Because they both hated the plan and were under the misconception
that it would go away, which it did not, instead bouncing back. The Greek side
wanted to go back to the 1960 system with some modifications. The Greek Cypriots
did not want to accept either political equality or two separate states as the
constituent elements of the hopefully-to-be United States of Cyprus, or whatever
its name may be.
Question - What about bizonality?
Soylemez - The Annan plan is remotely based on bizonality. The Turkish Cypriot
side want sovereignty as part and parcel of their territory. But the Annan plan
envisages the use of their rights "sovereignly," which is legally less than the
concept of sovereignty.
Question - Going back to the first question, why was there all the pressure
for an urgent solution now?
Soylemez - Obviously the galvanizing date was Cyprus' accession to the EU on May
1, but equal impetus and pressure was provided by the Bush administration
wanting stability and not friction in the enlarged geography of the Middle East.
The United States want a free flow of oil at reasonable prices. They want to
control the flow of oil from Baku to Ceyhan, which is next door to Cyprus.
Question - Can we congratulate the secretary-general, Kofi Annan, and his
special representative, Alvaro De Soto, for their determined efforts and
success, instead of villifying them, for making a road map which now seems to be
capable of solving the Cyprus problem if the expected referanda approve what has
been agreed between the parties and imposed by the secretary-general?
Soylemez - Yes, indeed we should. As Kofi Annan said, never before have the two
parties come so close to an agreement, and he congratulated both the leaders,
Denktas and Papadopoulos, for taking the risky diplomatic initiative of putting
their careers on the line.
Question - Is there still a snag?
Soylemez - I am afraid there is. Nothing is finished until it is finished. All
will be well if it ends well. The final package deal must allay the worst fears
of both parties. The final agreement must give them encouragement. They should
feel safe in recommending acceptance to their constituents. If this is not the
case, then one or both of the referenda may be in danger. The secretary-general
should bear this in mind, that only a just and fair deal can pass the popular
scrutiny of both sides to become a lasting deal. Provided that the goodwill and
momentum are preserved and the promises kept, in all likelihood Oslo will be
waiting to give Denktas and Papadopoulos the 2004 Nobel Peace Prize to crown
their success and, once again, as an incurable optimist, I am prepared to bet on
it.